The impact of COVID-19 on fertility plans in Italy, Germany, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom by Luppi, F. (ORCID:0000-0002-0883-3571) et al.
DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH
VOLUME 43, ARTICLE 47, PAGES 1399–1412




The impact of COVID-19 on fertility plans





© 2020 Francesca Luppi, Bruno Arpino & Alessandro Rosina.
This open-access work is published under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution 3.0 Germany (CC BY 3.0 DE), which permits use, reproduction,









Demographic Research: Volume 43, Article 47
Descriptive Finding
https://www.demographic-research.org 1399
The impact of COVID-19 on fertility plans in Italy, Germany,






This study offers a descriptive overview of changes in fertility plans during the COVID-
19 crisis in a sample of the young population (18–34) in Italy, Germany, France, Spain,
and the United Kingdom. The data were collected between 27 March and 7 April 2020.
RESULTS
Our results show that fertility plans have been negatively revised in all countries, but not
in the same way. In Germany and France fertility plans changed moderately, with many
people still planning or postponing their decision to have a child. In Italy, however, the
proportion of abandoners is much higher than in the other countries, and the proportion
of those deciding to postpone their plans is lower. Moreover, across countries the
demographic characteristics of individuals appear to be associated with fertility plans in
different ways. In Italy, abandoners are common among individuals younger than 30 and
those without a tertiary education. In Germany, abandoners are slightly more prevalent
in the regions most affected by COVID-19. In the United Kingdom, the individuals that
most frequently abandoned their fertility plans are those who expect the crisis to have a
dramatic negative effect on their future income. Finally, in France and Spain we do not
observe a clear pattern of revision of fertility plans.
CONTRIBUTION
These results suggest that different mechanisms are at work, possibly due to the different
economic, demographic, and policy pre-crisis background and post-crisis prospects.
Low-fertility contexts in particular appear to be more at risk of a fertility loss due to the
crisis.
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1. Introduction
Historically, economic and health crises have never been preferred periods for a couple
to decide to have a baby (e.g., Marteleto et al. 2020; Trinitapoli and Yeatman 2011;
Sobotka, Skirbekk, and Philipov 2011; Vrachnis et al. 2014). Regarding health crises, the
evidence shows that during and after major epidemics fertility declines strongly (Stone
2020; see e.g., Chandra and Yu 2015a, 2015b; Chandra et al. 2018 for the Spanish flu,
and Marteleto et al. 2020 for the Zika epidemic). As for economic crises, an overall
economic downturn and the loss of jobs create a climate of great uncertainty, which
depresses family projects (Adsera 2011; Goldstein et al. 2013; Matysiak, Vignoli, and
Sobotka 2018; Vignoli et al. 2020). Therefore, although the COVID-19 crisis has very
special features compared with previous crises, we may expect similar demographic
outcomes (see Aassve et al. 2020 for a recent discussion of possible post-pandemic
fertility trajectories according to countries’ income level).
The fertility consequences of the COVID-19 crisis are not expected to be equally
distributed within and between countries. The pandemic itself has affected countries
differently; e.g., in terms of timing. Furthermore, demographic as well as economic,
contextual characteristics may support or further reduce individuals’ pre-crisis fertility
plans, reducing (or not) the uncertainty derived from the enduring health emergency and
the negative economic trend (Adsera 2004; Kreyenfeld 2016; Caltabiano, Comolli, and
Rosina 2017; Vignoli, Tocchioni, and Mattei 2019). In Europe, the uncertainty caused by
the COVID-19 pandemic may have been amplified by the still-ongoing effect of the 2008
financial crisis, especially in Southern Europe, where young people’s and women’s
employment and fertility levels are the lowest (Matysiak, Vignoli, and Sobotka 2018).
Additionally, the physical distancing required by COVID-19 containment strategies has
imposed restrictions on physical intergenerational support, and this could influence
fertility plans more strongly in those countries such as Italy and Spain where
grandparental childcare is more intensive (Bordone, Arpino, and Aassve 2017; Price et
al. 2018) due to a lower availability of childcare services.
The aim of this study is to describe changes in young people’s fertility plans – i.e.,
in couples’ intention to have a child in the near future – due to the COVID-19 crisis at
the start of the health emergency in Europe. We compare five countries (Italy, France,
Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom) that are characterized by different welfare
regimes, pre-pandemic fertility levels, and impact of COVID-19. Within countries we
contrast groups based on key sociodemographic characteristics.
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2. Data and method
We use data from the Rapporto Giovani survey carried out by Istituto Giuseppe Toniolo
and IPSOS. As far as we know, this is the first international survey of the impact of
COVID-19 on fertility plans. It was conducted from 27 to 31 March 2020 in Italy and
from 2 to 7 April, 2020 in the other countries. The interviews were conducted using a
CAWI-administered (Computer Assisted Web Interviewing) questionnaire on a sample
of young adults aged between 18 and 34 (6,000 respondents in total). Individuals were
selected with a quota sampling technique: representativeness was guaranteed by defining
the sample quotas in terms of a significant set of variables (gender, age, geographical
origin, education, marital status, etc.) (more information available at:
https://www.rapportogiovani.it/osservatorio/).
Respondents answered a question about what their fertility plans were in early 2020,
before the start of the COVID-19 outbreak (retrospective question). Although this
measure could be affected by recall bias, the very short time frame between the survey
and the time reference for the initial fertility plan (January 2020) should greatly limit the
extent of this bias. A further question on individuals’ fertility plans at the time of
interview was only asked of those who answered that they had some intention to conceive
a child in the year 2020. Specifically, this last question was: “Did the coronavirus
emergency interfere in any way with this plan?” with three possible answers from which
we derived three groups of respondents: (1) “No, the plan remains confirmed for 2020”
(‘still planning’); (2) “The plan remains confirmed but I had to postpone it”
(‘postponers’); and (3) “I have abandoned the plan for now” (‘abandoners’).
We accounted for heterogeneity in fertility plans by gender, age (18–24, 25–29, 30–
34), and education (tertiary vs. lower). To consider the possible economic effect of the
crisis we also considered individuals’ perceived uncertainty about their future income.
This is likely to be a projection of both their occupational (in)security and the expected
indirect effect of the crisis on the economic system and labour market. The question asked
was “Thinking about your future, do you think the current coronavirus emergency will
have a positive or negative impact on your (personal) income?” Answers were given on
a scale of 1 (very negative) to 5 (very positive). The variable was dichotomized, taking
value 0 if the respondent was not expecting any effect or a positive effect was expected
(values 3–5), and value 1 if the respondent was expecting negative income shocks (values
1–2). Finally, we considered the possible contextual effect of living in a region with a
high number of COVID-19 cases. The data were obtained at the regional level (NUTS2
or NUTS1 according to the level of aggregation available in the survey) in the period
between 9 and 14 April 2020 (from https://www.data.gouv.fr/fr/reuses/carte-de-
levolution-du-covid-en-france/, https://coronavirus.data.gov.uk/#regions, https://github.
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com/open-covid-19/data#metadata). We considered the tertiles of the cumulative number
of confirmed COVID-19 cases per 1,000 inhabitants and generated a dummy variable for
living in a region with a high number of the COVID-19 cases (regions above the second
tertile).
We calculated the adjusted proportions (i.e., predicted probabilities) for the three
alternative fertility plans by using multinomial models and including the
sociodemographic variables of interest one by one, and controlling for gender. In
preliminary analyses we also added interactions between gender and the other variables,
but the results did not show any evidence of a relationship with fertility plans. When the
results are commented on the corresponding p-value have been added in parentheses.
3. Results
A few days after the survey was conducted, the COVID-19 pandemic scenario was as
described in Table 1. The cumulative number of positive cases at the country level gives
a rough idea of how the pandemic had affected countries differently at that time. The
same table shows the distribution of other indicators (before the pandemic) at the country
level and at the regional level for regions with a high number of COVID-19 cases. Italy
and Spain show the worst-case scenario in terms of both labour market and fertility
indicators. Generally, the regions most affected by COVID-19 are also those in which
women and young people show (on average) better labour market conditions than the
country average. Regarding fertility indicators, only for Italy and Spain do we observe a
higher fertility rate in the most affected regions compared to the country average.
The proportion of individuals who in January 2020 were planning to conceive a child
within that year (Table 1) is roughly the same across countries, but slightly higher in Italy
and France (26.6% and 27.5% respectively) than in Germany, Spain, and the United
Kingdom (21.4%, 21.6% and 23.6% respectively). However, across the five countries the
consequences of the crisis appear unequal. Our data show three alternative patterns (Table
1). First, the impact appears to be (relatively) less dramatic in some countries: in France
and Germany there is quite a high number of postponers (those who were planning to
have a child within 12 months and postponed their decision because of the pandemic),
but a relatively small number of abandoners (those who were planning to have a child
within 12 months and abandoned, at least temporarily, their decision because of the
pandemic); more than 30% of the plans are still ongoing. The second pattern is observed
for Spain and the United Kingdom, where around 20% are still planning (were planning
a child within the next 12 months and maintained their plan) – less than in France and
Germany – but most others are more prone to postpone than to abandon (even though in
Spain the proportion of abandoners is 10 percentage points higher than in the United
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Kingdom). Finally, in Italy the percentage of those still planning is in-between the two
previous groups, but with an equally high proportion of postponers and abandoners. In
particular, the prevalence of abandoners in Italy is substantially higher than in the other
countries.
Table 1: Sample distribution of fertility plans and some country- and
regional-level indicators of COVID-19, young people and female
employment conditions, and fertility
Italy Germany France Spain UK
Data from Rapporto giovani:
Original sample size 2,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
% not planning to have a child (January 2020) 73.4 78.6 72.5 78.4 76.4
Sample size of those planning to have a child (January 2020) 532 214 275 216 236
% Still planning1 25.6 30.7 32.0 21.2 23.0
% Postponers1 37.9 55.1 50.7 49.6 57.8
% Abandoners1 36.5 14.2 17.3 29.2 19.2
Contextual data:
Number of COVID-19 cases in mid-April 2020 (1,000 inhabitants)
in the country 2.7 1.6 2.0 3.9 1.5
in the regions with the highest number of cases2 4.6 2.2 3.2 7.3 1.9
% of NEET3 (15–24) in 20194
in the country 18.0 5.7 10.6 12.1 11.5
in the regions with a higher number of cases 11.8 5.2 11.1 8.6 13.1
Female employment rate (25–34) 20195
in the country 50.2 73.0 62.9 58.4 71.5
in the regions with a higher number of cases 68.4 78.2 74.2 76.7 76.4
Mean age at birth 20185
in the country 32.0 31.1 30.6 32.2 30.6
in the regions with a higher number of cases 32.0 31.2 30.5 32.8 30.4
Mean age at first birth 20185 (in the country) 31.2 29.7 28.7 31.0 29.0
Total Fertility Rate 20185
in the country 1.29 1.57 1.88 1.26 1.68
in the regions with a higher number of cases 1.40 1.55 1.74 1.29 1.64
Notes: 1 Calculated for the sample of those who in January 2020 were planning to have a child.
2 Average across regions. Regions with a high number of Covid-19 cases are those in the most affected third of the regional distribution
for this indicator (Italy: Valle d'Aosta, Emilia Romagna, Liguria, Lombardy, Piemonte, Trentino Alto Adige, Veneto; Germany: Baden-
Wurttemberg, Bavaria, North Rhine, Saarland; France: Bourgogne France Comte, Corsica, Grand Est, Hauts de France, Ile de France;
Spain: Northeast, Madrid; UK: Greater London, Northeast, Northwest, Wales). Source: https://www.data.gouv.fr/fr/reuses/carte-de-
levolution-du-covid-en-france/; https://coronavirus.data.gov.uk/#regions; https://github.com/open-covid-19/data#metadata.
3 NEET: young people Not in Employment, Education or Training, according to Eurostat definition
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Glossary:NEET.
4 Source: Eurostat (age: 15–24); UK Government for England (age: 16–24); Welsh Government for Wales (age: 16–24)
5 Source: Eurostat.
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Only in Germany, France, and the United Kingdom do those living in regions with
a high, cumulated prevalence of COVID-19 cases appear to change their fertility plans.
In these countries we observe a lower proportion of those who are ‘still planning’ in ‘red’
regions with high Covid prevalence than in the other regions, and also a higher proportion
of abandoners in Germany (p-value 0.017) and postponers in the United Kingdom (p-
value 0.052). This is not the case in Spain and Italy, where the pattern appears to be the
reverse (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Adjusted proportions of the three fertility plans according to the
regional level of spread of COVID-19, by country (multinomial
models, controlling for gender)
Fertility plans have not changed in the same way across age groups (Figure 2). A
common trend across the countries is the increasing proportion with age of those ‘still
planning’; i.e., the proportion is higher among individuals aged 25–29 and 30–34 than
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Figure 2: Adjusted proportions of the three fertility plans in the three age
classes, by country (multinomial models, controlling for gender)
Because a high proportion of individuals aged 18–24 in our sample is still enrolled
in school/university, to examine the role of education we restricted the sample to
individuals aged 25–34. More specifically, we explored whether having a higher
education is protecting pre-crisis fertility plans (Figure 3). Higher education may be
associated with a higher socioeconomic status, which may reduce uncertainty arising
from the economic crisis. A positive tendency appears only for Italy (p-value 0.045) and
for the United Kingdom, where having a tertiary education is associated with a higher
prevalence of those who are still planning, while in Italy there is a lower prevalence of
abandoners. In Spain, having a tertiary education is associated with a higher proportion
of postponers compared to those who do not have an academic degree, while in Germany
(p-value 0.024) and France having a tertiary education is associated with a slightly higher
proportion of abandoners. Having a tertiary education tends to level off the probability
of abandoning original fertility plans in all countries, while among the lower-educated
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Figure 3: Adjusted proportions of the three fertility plans for those having or
not having a tertiary degree, by country (multinomial models,
controlling for gender); age 25–34 only
Finally, individuals that expect an insecure future income due to the current
economic crisis are more likely to have modified their fertility plans. Among those aged
25–34, this tendency appears in our data for the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain
(Figure 4). In these cases those who perceive their personal income to be at risk show a
higher probability of postponing fertility plans in Spain and of abandoning fertility plans
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Figure 4: Adjusted proportions of the three fertility plans according to
expected effect of the crisis on personal income, by country
(multinomial models, controlling for gender); age 25–34 only
4. Discussion
Our study provides descriptive evidence of how young people’s fertility plans have
changed in five European countries during the first phase of the COVID-19 pandemic.
There are differences both between and within countries. In countries where the previous
economic and labour market situation was more positive (i.e., Germany and France), the
proportion of those abandoning their fertility plans for 2020 is much lower than in the
other countries; these countries show the highest proportion of people who are still
planning to have a child during the year 2020. By contrast, in Spain, and even more
dramatically in Italy (the first of the five countries to be affected by the pandemic), people
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The only stable within-country result is the ‘protective’ effect of age in maintaining
original fertility plans. A possible explanation is that people in their 30s – and women in
particular – are more prone to preserve their pre-crisis fertility plans (Sobotka, Skirbekk,
and Philipov 2011), which is consistent with the lower tendency to postpone the decision
to have a child among those aged 30–34 compared to the other two age groups. In Italy
the tendency to abandon this decision is lower for the oldest age group, while in the other
countries there is no difference with the 25–29 age group. This unique path could be due
to the age of mothers at first birth being higher in Italy than in the other countries.
Previous research has shown that in Italy the Great Recession did not change the
propensity to have a first child of women in the last years of their reproductive period
(Caltabiano, Comolli, and Rosina 2017), while fertility was more affected at younger
ages (below 30) (Goldstein et al. 2013).
Economic uncertainty stemming from the crisis is not clearly associated with a
higher probability of abandoning or postponing fertility plans within the countries, except
in the United Kingdom, where those who perceive a greater future income-related risk
from the COVID-19 crisis have the same probability of abandoning their original fertility
plans as in Spain and Italy. The fact that the United Kingdom is the only country in our
data with a liberal welfare state – i.e., where policy measures to protect personal income
are less developed than in other types of welfare states – might explain why personal
income expectations are so relevant in influencing fertility plans.
Even the regional prevalence of COVID-19 cases does not suggest a consistent path
of association with the change in fertility expectation across countries. Only in Germany,
France, and the United Kingdom do the ‘red’ regions show a higher prevalence of
abandoners or postponers. Instead, in Italy and Spain the probability of abandoning
fertility plans is lower in the regions most affected by the pandemic. However, in these
cases the most affected regions are also among the economically best-performing regions
in the country, with a fertility rate above the country average.
Our results suggest that the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the consequent
economic crisis cannot be interpreted using the same mechanisms in all European
countries. Previous economic and demographic conditions (as, arguably, the type of
welfare state) seem to influence the fertility plans of the young population in all countries.
However, the effects of the pandemic on fertility plans that we find will not necessarily
translate into effects on fertility realisations. The differential effect between the
consequences of the pandemic on fertility plans and realisations will depend on many
factors, including how the pandemic develops and the policies that each country
implements. Further studies using ongoing prospective surveys could test the effect of
the COVID-19 pandemic on both fertility plans and realisations. Additionally, our
descriptive results call for future theoretical and empirical research to better understand
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the mechanisms behind the heterogenous impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on
demographic outcomes.
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